Affirmative Action: Unresolved Questions Amidst a Changing Judiciary by Deale, Frank
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Publications and Research CUNY School of Law
1990
Affirmative Action: Unresolved Questions Amidst
a Changing Judiciary
Frank Deale
CUNY School of Law
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: http://academicworks.cuny.edu/cl_pubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CUNY School of Law at CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact
AcademicWorks@cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deale, Frank, "Affirmative Action: Unresolved Questions Amidst a Changing Judiciary" (1990). CUNY Academic Works.
http://academicworks.cuny.edu/cl_pubs/320
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: UNRESOLVED
QUESTIONS AMIDST A CHANGING JUDICIARY
FRANK DEALE*
INTRODUCTION
Affirmative action has proven to be one of the most controversial areas of
civil rights law, spawning a large number of plurality and closely divided opin-
ions by a highly fragmented Supreme Court.' In many respects, the Court's
difficulty in providing bright line rules to govern this area is a reflection of the
divisions in society surrounding the issue and the highly politicized context in
which it arises.
This Article refers to affirmative action as a mechanism for providing
preferences to certain applicants for specific benefits because those applicants
possess traits which have been used in the past as a basis for discriminating
against members of the group to which they belong. The most frequent and
controversial use of affirmative action under this definition has occurred where
private parties or public authorities have accorded preferential treatment to
members of racial or ethnic groups or to women. Affirmative action has also
been provided, however, to veterans,2 persons with disabilities or handicaps, 3
and, in some cases, to persons of a particular sexual orientation.4
* B.A., 1976, Antioch College; J.D., 1979, University of Pennsylvania School of Law.
The author is Legal Director of the Center for Constitutional Rights and an adjunct professor
of law at C.U.N.Y. Law School. The views expressed in this Article are the author's own.
1. See, e.g., Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)(4-2-3); Local No.
93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986)(5-4).
2. See Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1988).
4. For example, the National Lawyers Guild provides hiring preferences for those of gay
or lesbian sexual orientation. Interview with Sandra Lowe, Staff Attorney at Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund (Aug. 14, 1990). Preferences are also conceded to "those pos-
sessed of athletic skills, to the children of alumni, to the affluent who may bestow their largess
on the institutions, and to those having connections with celebrities, the famous and the power-
ful." Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Of course, the preferential treatment accorded to alumni, institutional benefactors, and
other persons occupying positions of power differs considerably from the preferential treatment
accorded to members of racial minority groups, women, or gay men and lesbians. The former
groups represent privileged members of society who have not suffered the consequences of
social, economic, and political discrimination, and whose interests need no affirmative govern-
mental protection because such protection is already guaranteed by the social order they have
erected in the "private" sector.
By contrast, the latter groups represent those persons whose ability to achieve their fullest
potential as members of society has been historically curtailed by various forms of social, eco-
nomic, and political discrimination. While such treatment has been prohibited by law, the gov-
ernment's involvement in eliminating discrimination carries with it an important disadvantage
in that the ultimate determination of what forms of discrimination are to be prohibited is sub-
ject to a political process in which members of these latter groups have limited power.
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Assuming that the number of cases decided by the Supreme Court is an
accurate indication of the most disputed areas of affirmative action, the issue
of racial preferences is at the top of the list. The Court has decided at least
twelve cases involving challenges by whites to the legality of such preferences.5
These decisions, however, still leave many important issues unresolved, and
the future of affirmative action uncertain. This Article seeks to identify some
of these issues and to provide some insight as to how they will be resolved in
future litigation.
THE CASES
Most challenges to affirmative action plans have been based on assertions
that race or gender preferences are barred by law, in particular, by the four-
teenth amendment6 and by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7 The
great irony of these legal challenges is that both of these provisions of law were
specifically designed to eradicate the long-standing legacy of racial discrimina-
tion endured by people of color throughout this nation's history.' Reliance
upon these provisions as bases for challenging affirmative action plans that are
race-based uproots these historic provisions from their social, legal, and polit-
ical contexts.
Although the Supreme Court traditionally has been sensitive to the his-
tory behind these provisions, the changing composition of the Court over the
past decade has resulted in the Court's adoption of an ahistorical, sometimes
perverse, reading of the anti-discrimination laws. The current Court has be-
come obsessed with questions such as: a) whether the affirmative action plan
has been adopted by the employer voluntarily as opposed to being ordered by
a court;9 b) whether beneficiaries of the affirmative action plan are identifiable
5. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1989); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 28 of
the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n
of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
8. As Justice Brennan stated in his opinion for the Court in United Steelworkers v. Weber:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of
racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had "been excluded from
the American dream for so long," constituted the first legislative prohibition of all
voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segre-
gation and hierarchy.
443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
9. See Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (voluntary affirmative
action plan); Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986) (Court-ordered affirmative action plan); Local 28 of the Sheetmetal Workers' Int'l Ass'n
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986)(Court-ordered affirmative action plan).
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victims of discrimination; ° and c) whether such plans must be scrutinized as
strictly as programs which discriminate against racial minorities." Although
some of these inquiries are arguably justified by the legal provisions at issue,
the Court has also injected its own ideas of "sin" into its legal calculus."
A. Voluntary Affirmative Action
The Court has been sharply divided over the circumstances which justify
an employer's voluntary implementation of an affirmative action plan, or, in
other words, the predicate which allows an employer to provide racial or gen-
der preferences to individuals or groups of workers. 13 The Supreme Court
first addressed this issue in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,"4 in
which a steelworker challenged his employer's decision to institute an affirma-
five action plan designed to increase the number of black skilled craftworkers.
In order to achieve this goal, the employer started a training program which
utilized a racial quota for admission purposes.' 5 The operation of the quota
resulted in some blacks with less seniority than whites gaining admission to
the program. Weber, a white person who had been excluded from the pro-
gram, brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.", The Court up-
held the affirmative action plan, concluding that the legislative history of Title
VII indicated that "Congress did not intend wholly to prohibit private volun-
tary affirmative action efforts."' 7 Concluding that section 7030) of Title VII
was meant to assure that "management prerogatives and union freedoms ...
10. See Local 28 of the Sheetmetal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (a
bare majority held that Title VII did not require a court to find actual victims of discrimination
before ordering remedies).
11. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (holding that strict scru-
tiny applies to racial classifications that advantage minorities but disadvantage whites).
12. See, eg., Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100
HARV. L. REv. 78, 80 (1986) (arguing that "the Court has approved affirmative action only as
precise penance for the specific sins of racism a government, union, or employer has committed
in the past" and providing a critique of this approach).
13. Although the following discussion deals primarily with affirmative action in the con-
text of employment, state educational institutions have also implemented affirmative action
plans. In cases involving these plans, the Court focuses on the justification for affirmative action
in admissions policies. The Court has narrowed the inquiry to a determination of whether the
affirmative action plan can be justified by governmental interests substantial enough to pass
fourteenth amendment scrutiny. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). This issue is more fully addressed in the following text.
14. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
15. The plan reserved 50% of the openings in the training program for black employees
until the percentage of black craftworkers in the plant was commensurate with the percentage
of blacks in the local labor force. During the pendency of the litigation, blacks constituted 3917
of the Gramercy, Louisiana, labor force, but only 1.83% of the skilled craftworkers at the plant.
Id. at 198-99.
16. Section 703 of the Act makes it an unlawful practice for an employer to "fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1982).
17. 443 U.S. at 203.
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be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible,"18 the Court applied a"manifest imbalance" standard of scrutiny. The statistical imbalance which
existed between the percentage of blacks in the surrounding community work
force (39%) and the number of skilled black workers at the plant (1.83%)
constituted, according to the Court, a "conspicuous racial imbalance in [a]
traditionally segregated job categor[y]."' 9 The Court did not provide an open-
ended approval of such plans, implying that in order to pass judicial scrutiny
such plans had to be temporary in nature and could not unnecessarily tram-
mel the rights of white employees. 0
In 1987, the Court revisited the question of the constitutionality of a vol-
untarily adopted affirmative action plan in Johnson v. Santa Clara Transporta-
tion Agency.2' At issue was an affirmative action plan which provided a
preference to women seeking skilled jobs.22 The plaintiff, a white man, sought
the job of road dispatcher, which ultimately was offered to a woman even
though he had scored two points higher than she during the interview phase of
the application process. The Court upheld the affirmative action plan, basing
its decision on the authority of Weber.23
The change in composition of the Court in the intervening ten years since
Weber was, however, reflected in the spread of votes in the Johnson decision.
Weber was decided by a 5-2 vote with Justices Powell and Stevens not partici-
pating.2 14 By the time Johnson reached the Court, Justices O'Connor and
Scalia had taken the seats of Justices Stewart and Burger. Justice Scalia wrote
a dissenting opinion in Johnson, joined by Justices Rehnquist and White, call-
ing for the overruling of Weber.21 Although Justice Stevens concurred with
the majority, he acknowledged that Weber was "at odds with my understand-
ing of the actual intent of the authors of the legislation."26 Justice O'Connor
also joined with the majority, but only on the grounds that the statistical dis-
parity between the percentage of qualified women in the skilled labor force and
the percentage of skilled women workers employed by the agency was suffi-
cient to make out a "prima facie Title VII case brought by unsuccessful wo-
men job applicants." 27
Four members of the Court are thus clearly dissatisfied with the Weber
ruling that a predicate for a voluntary affirmative action plan exists when sta-
18. 443 U.S. at 206 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 29 (1963),
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2391).
19. Id. at 209.
20. Id. at 208-09.
21. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
22. The plan authorized the employer to consider sex as one factor in making promotions
within a traditionally segregated job classification. Id. at 620-21.
23. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
24. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Stewart, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. 443 U.S. at 195.
25. 480 U.S. at 669-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 656 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tistics demonstrate a "conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated
job categories," but fails to establish a prima facie violation of Title VY.11
Three Justices have called for outright reversal of Weber, a fourth has sug-
gested changing the predicate before the affirmative action plan can be imple-
mented, and a fifth has acknowledged that Weber was probably wrongly
decided. When Justices Kennedy and Souter have the opportunity to address
these issues, they will have three possible options: they can side with the lib-
eral wing of the Court and reaffirm Weber; they can add their voices to the
chorus of Justices calling for Weber's reversal; or they can join Justice
O'Connor and thereby require that unless there is a sufficient statistical dispar-
ity between the number of skilled workers on the job and the number of quali-
fied workers in the relevant labor pool that would make out a prima facie case
of discrimination under Title VII, the necessary predicate for establishing a
voluntary affirmative action plan will not be deemed to have been established.
There is already some indication of how Justice Kennedy will vote when
the Court revisits the issue. In City of Richmond v. J..A. Croson,29 the Court,
in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, struck down a Richmond, Virginia, affirm-
ative action plan which required prime contractors to whom the city awarded
construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of the
contract to one or more minority business enterprises. 30 The Court held that
the plan violated the fourteenth amendment and that "there is nothing ap-
proaching aprimafacie case of a constitutional or statutory violation by any-
one in the Richmond construction industry. ' 3 ' Justice Kennedy's willingness
to join the majority in Croson indicates that the votes may exist to overrule
Weber or require a more substantial predicate before a voluntary affirmative
action plan will pass judicial scrutiny.
The Court has emphasized the difference between the "prima facie" stan-
dard adopted in Croson and the "manifest imbalance" standard approved by
the Court in Weber. As Justice Brennan noted in Johnson:
[I]n cases such as Weber, where the employment decision at issue
involves the selection of unskilled persons for a training program,
the "manifest imbalance" standard permits comparison with the
general labor force. By contrast, the "prima facie" standard would
require comparison with the percentage of minorities or women
qualified for the job for which the trainees are being trained, a stan-
dard that would have invalidated the plan in Weber itself.32
The adoption of the "prima facie" standard will seriously curtail the ex-
28. 443 U.S. 193, 209.
29. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
30. A minority business enterprise was defined as a business at least 51% of which is
owned and controlled by minority group members, who are defined as "[c]itizens of the United
States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." Id. at 713
(quoting Ordinance No. 83-69-59, codified in RiCHMOND, VA., CrrY CODE § 12-156(a) (1985)).
31. Id. at 724 (emphasis in original).
32. 480 U.S. at 633 n.10.
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tent to which employers will implement voluntary affirmative action plans. If
an employer can be held liable to white workers for adopting an affirmative
action plan where there is not a prima facie violation of Title VII or the four-
teenth amendment, most employers will prefer to wait until they are sued by
minorities or women before they begin making the changes necessary to end
discrimination. Under the "manifest imbalance" test, employers had much
more room to address racial and gender imbalances, because they were not
open to suits by disgruntled whites. The "prima facie" test, if adopted, will
encourage the employer to do nothing until the employee balance becomes so
skewed as to provide an inference of discriminatory conduct.
Given the dissension on the Court concerning Weber, particularly that
surrounding the issues of the legislative intent behind Title VII and the predi-
cate necessary to establish a violation thereof, the Weber opinion rests upon a
very shaky foundation, and has doubtful continuing validity.
B. The Issue of Identifiable Victims
Another issue not fully resolved by the Court in the affirmative action
area is whether and to what extent a court-ordered affirmative action plan can
provide relief to persons who are not identifiable victims of discrimination.
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in 1984 in Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts.33 In that case, black firefighters and the United
States Department of Justice began litigation against the City of Memphis and
its fire department, alleging that the defendants had engaged in discriminatory
hiring and promotion practices in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1983. The parties negotiated a consent decree which provided specific
affirmative relief to the plaintiffs, including hiring and promotional
preferences.34
After implementation of the decree, the City claimed that a budgetary
shortfall would require it to lay off workers according to the City's traditional
seniority system, which would result in the termination of many blacks who
had been hired pursuant to the consent decree. Plaintiffs went to court and
successfully obtained a preliminary injunction which ordered that the City of
Memphis "not apply the seniority policy proposed insofar as it will decrease
the percentage of black lieutenants, drivers, inspectors and privates that are
presently employed.",35 The injunction was upheld by the Court of Appeals
33. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
34. The City agreed to promote 13 named individuals and provide backpay to 81 employ-
ees of the fire department. It also agreed to increase, over time, minority representation in the
fire department until it approximated the percentage of blacks in the labor force in Shelby
County, Tennessee. In a previous decree settling litigation conducted against the City of Mem-
phis by the Department of Justice in 1974, the City had agreed to establish an interim hiring
goal of filling 50% of the job vacancies in the department with qualified black applicants. This
provision was included in the 1980 decree with an additional goal of assuring that 20% of
promotions in each job classification was to go to blacks. Id. at 565.
35. Id. at 567.
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for the Sixth Circuit.36 Consequently, three white employees were laid off who
would otherwise have been protected by the City's seniority system. 37
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice White, reversed both lower
court orders, concluding that the terms of the consent decree did not address
the issue of layoffs and that the lower court had abused its discretion by modi-
fying the consent decree over the objection of the City.35 The Court further
held that the issuance of the injunction below contravened the policy of Title
VII,39 as expressed in section 706(g) of the statute, which provides, in the view
of the Court in Stotts, "make-whole relief only to those who have been actual
victims of illegal discrimination."'  The Justice Department incorrectly read
Stotts as holding that: 1) the only relief available under Title VII is make-
whole relief; and 2) relief can be provided only to identifiable victims of dis-
crimination. The proper reading of Stotts became clear, however, from subse-
quent cases, especially Local 28 of the Sheetmetal Workers' International
Association v. EEOC,41 in which Justice White, author of the Stotts opinion,
stated in his dissent that "§ 706(g) does not bar relief for nonvictims in all
circumstances." 42 Based on its misinterpretation of Stotts, the Department of
Justice launched a campaign in over fifty different municipalities to overturn
similar consent decrees that provided relief to individuals who had not been
identifiable victims of discrimination.43
In most of these cases,' the arguments of the Department of Justice were
rebuffed; however, the Supreme Court did not directly address the question of
identifiable victims until its 1985 term when it agreed to hear two companion
cases posing the issue. In one of the cases, Local No. 93, International Associa-
tion of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,45 the Court had before it a consent
decree entered into by the City of Cleveland and an organization of black
firefighters who had sued the City for its discriminatory policies concerning
minority firefighters. A solid majority of the Court, including three members
of the Stotts majority,' held that "whether or not § 706(g) precludes a court
from imposing certain forms of race-conscious relief after trial, that provision
36. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 551 (6th Cir. 1982).
37. 467 U.S. at 567 n.2.
38. Id. at 574-76.
39. Although concurring in the judgment of the Court, Justice Stevens felt that the major-
ity's discussion of Title VII was "wholly advisory." Id. at 590. The majority opinion of the
Court, however, expressed the narrow view that "the Court of Appeals imposed on the parties
as an adjunct of settlement something that could not have been ordered had the case gone to
trial and the plaintiffs proved that a pattern or practice of discrimination existed." Id. at 579.
40. Id. at 580.
41. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
42. Id. at 499.
43. See M. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION, 20-37
n.160 (1990). L
44. See cases listed in Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. at 475 n.47.
45. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
46. Members of the Stotts majority who were also voting in the Cleveland majority were
Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor.
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does not apply to relief awarded in a consent decree."'47
The companion case, Local 28 of the Sheetmetal Workers' International
Association v. EEOC,48 required the Court to review decisions of two lower
federal courts49 upholding an affirmative action plan which required that Lo-
cal 28 increase minority membership to 29% and establish a training program
and fund that was to "be used for the purpose of remedying discrimination."5 0
The Court held that the relief ordered by the lower courts was consistent
with Title VII, based on its reading of the legislative history of the statute and
especially section 706(g), which, according to the Court, was designed to "em-
phasize that an employer would not violate the statute merely by having an
imbalanced work force, and consequently that a court could not order an em-
ployer to adopt racial preferences merely to correct such an imbalance." 51
Despite the clarity of Justice Brennan's analysis of the legislative history,
that part of the opinion carried only a plurality of the Court." Three mem-
bers of the Court expressed open disagreement with the plurality's reading of
Title VII, 3 and a fourth "generally agree[d]" with the plurality's analysis of
the legislative history but dissented on the ground that the remedy imposed
against the union was "inequitable."54 Justice Powell provided the fifth vote,
upholding the plurality's view of the legislative history of Title VII and the
imposition of liability on Local 28. Again, the positions of Justices Kennedy
and Souter on this issue will determine whether a majority of the current court
will authorize court-ordered affirmative action relief to non-identifiable vic-
tims of discrimination. Short of a case which like Local 28 presents an ex-
traordinary record of discrimination, 55 this seems unlikely.
47. 478 U.S. at 515.
48. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
49. The District Court issued two contempt orders for the purposes of enforcing compli-ance with the affirmative action plan, only one of which has been actually reported. See EEOCv. Local 638 and Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
33,198 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Both the Supreme Court and Second Circuit opinions, however,provide a description of both orders. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 434-44 (1986); EEOC v. Local 638.. .Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172, 1176-78 (2d Cir. 1985).
50. 478 U.S. at 436.
51. Id. at 453.
52. The plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice
Powell concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.
53. 478 U.S. at 500 (Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 489 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. Id. at 499 (White, J., dissenting).
55. The facts of Local 28 were quite extraordinary. The union had been found guilty of
discrimination in both state and federal proceedings. See In re State Comm'n for HumanRights v. Farrell, 52 Misc. 2d 936, 277 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term), aff'd, 27A.D.2d 327, 278 N.Y.S.2d 982 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 974, 281 N.Y.S.2d 521, 228N.E.2d 691 (1967); In re State Comm'n of Human Rights v. Farrell, 47 Misc. 2d 799, 263N.Y.S.2d 250 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term 1965); In re State Comm'n for Human Rights v.Farrell, 47 Misc. 2d 244, 262 N.Y.S.2d 526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term), aff'd, 24 A.D.2d 128,264 N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965); In re State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Farrell, 43
Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term 1964). See also EEOC v. Local
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C. The Level of Scrutiny
This Article has focused thus far on the legality of affirmative action pro-
grams under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment also imposes strictures on the affirmative action
programs of public employers.5 6 When assessing equal protection claims in-
volving race classifications, the Court applies a heightened level of scrutiny
because it has traditionally considered such classifications "suspect." Once
heightened scrutiny is triggered, the classification can be justified only upon a
showing of a compelling state interest which must be satisfied by means nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest.
In its 1988 Term, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the question of
the level of scrutiny to be applied when a racial classification gives advantages
to minorities as opposed to placing burdens on them. In City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson,57 the Court for the first time held that strict scrutiny applies to
racial classifications which advantage minorities and disadvantage whites.
Although this conclusion is quite far-reaching in terms of equal protection
doctrine, the Croson majority implied that this result was in line with conven-
tional equal protection analysis since the governing body which enacted the
legislation at issue was mostly black, as was the population of the city. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated:
In this case, blacks comprise approximately 50% of the population
of the City of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the City Council
are held by blacks. The concern that a political majority will more
easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted
assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not
against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this case.5
Racial classifications which disadvantage whites should not be subjected
638, 401 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Steam,
Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Compressed Air, Ice Machine, Air Condi-
tioning, and General Pipefitters, 347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
At least two contempt proceedings were brought by city and state officials when the union
refused to abide by court orders. The cases were affirmed on three occasions by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. See EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985); EEOC
v. Local 638, 565 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976).
The union was found guilty of: 1) adopting discriminatory procedures and standards for
admission into its apprenticeship program; 2) restricting the size of its membership in order to
deny access to non-whites; 3) selectively organizing non-union sheetmetal shops with few, if
any, minority employees, and admitting to membership only white employees from these shops;
and 4) discriminating in favor of white applicants seeking to transfer from sister locals.
56. Section one of the fourteenth amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
58. Id. at 722.
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to a strict scrutiny analysis. The entire rationale for strict judicial review, as
articulated in United States v. Carolene Products59 and subsequent cases, was
to provide judicial solicitude to groups unable to protect their interests
through the normal workings of the political process because of historic forms
of discrimination against them. Although whites who are members of differ-
ent nationality or ethnic groups may have endured certain forms of discrimi-
nation, they have not suffered such treatment on the basis of their race. Even
as ethnic or national minorities, whites rather than blacks possess the political
power necessary to assure that their interests are taken into account.'
The Court's use of a strict scrutiny analysis to evaluate affirmative action
plans that advantage blacks and disadvantage whites is a sure indication that
such programs are in jeopardy." As the vast majority of affirmative action
plans involve decisions made by whites rather than blacks that disadvantage
other whites, the question raised by Croson is whether strict scrutiny analysis
will be applied to those programs.
The Court provided a tentative answer to this question in a case decided
last term, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.62 In that case, the Court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of two minority preference policies of the Federal
Communications Commission. One policy awarded an enhancement for mi-
nority ownership in comparative proceedings for new licenses, and the other
permitted, through a "distress sale" policy, a limited category of existing radio
and television broadcast stations to be transferred only to minority controlled
firns.6 3 In upholding the constitutionality of both programs, the Court re-
fused to apply a strict scrutiny analysis, concluding that "benign race meas-
ures mandated by Congress - even if those measures are not 'remedial' in the
sense of being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal
discrimination - are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives."" In using this analysis, the
Court followed Fullilove v. Klutznick,65 a 1980 case which upheld a Congres-
59. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Justice Stone set forth the following justifications for applying
heightened scrutiny: "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry." Id. at 152 n.4.
60. In addition to race, gender has served as a ground for discriminating against a segment
of the population. Women, for example, were barred by law from voting in some states until
passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920. A majority of the Court has yet to determine
that gender-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973).
61. Historically, strict scrutiny has been described as "strict in theory, fatal in fact." Gun-
ther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
62. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1989).
63. Id. at 3005.
64. Id. at 3008-09.
65. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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sional set-aside for minority businesses. The Metro Broadcasting Court re-
jected the Croson strict scrutiny formula with the observation that "race
conscious classifications adopted by Congress to address racial and ethnic dis-
crimination are subject to a different standard than such classifications pre-
scribed by state and local governments."66 Four members of the Court
dissented, arguing for the application of the strict scrutiny analysis and con-
cluding that the F.C.C. programs were constitutionally deficient 6 7
Although the decision in Metro Broadcasting is a significant victory for
affirmative action, the decision is quite limited and, placed in a broader con-
text, does not provide much cause for celebration. As an initial matter, the
decision only addresses affirmative action plans which have the imprimatur of
Congress. The Metro Broadcasting decision does not concern plans that have
been implemented by state and local governments 8 or private employers. 69
Presumably, the strict scrutiny analysis of Croson still governs plans by state
and local governments even though such plans may employ "benign racial
classifications." Additionally, the fact that four Justices dissented in Metro
Broadcasting may foretell the disintegration of the Court majority which de-
cided Fullilove.70 Finally, the leadership provided by Justice Brennan in this
area will no longer be present to assure the continuing vitality of previous
cases which upheld affirmative action plans.71
CONCLUSION
Efforts to protect the legal validity of affirmative action plans have
reached something of a crisis, with all signs pointing to the conclusion that
judicial interference will increasingly undercut such plans. Not only is it nec-
essary to establish demonstrable discrimination against minorities in order to
justify the implementation of an affirmative action program, but once imple-
mented, those programs are extremely limited as to beneficiaries. Moreover,
they are subject to intense scrutiny by the courts. These trends, which run
directly counter to civil rights law as it has developed since the late 1970s, are
a direct consequence of the shift in the federal judiciary effectuated during the
recent decade of Republican presidential rule. The retirement of Justice Bren-
66. 110 S. Ct at 3009.
67. Id. at 3028 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, CJ. & Scalia & Kennedy,
JJ.); id. at 3044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.).
68. Id. at 3009.
69. The Court did not address Title VII in the Metro Broadcasting decision.
70. The Fullilove majority consisted of former Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. 448 U.S. 448. One should note Justice O'Connor's
subtle observation in Metro Broadcasting that, "of course, Fullilove preceded our determination
in Croson that strict scrutiny applies to preferences that favor members of minority groups,
including challenges considered under the Fourteenth Amendment." 109 S. Ct. at 3032
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71. In each case where the Supreme Court, after full briefing and oral argument, issued a
written opinion upholding an affirmative action plan, the opinion of the Court was authored by
Justice Brennan, with the exception of Fullulove. 448 U.S. 448 (Burger, C.J.).
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nan, and the age gap between Justices Marshall and Blackmun and the re-
mainder of the Court, indicate that we are entering a new era of federal
jurisprudence which will bring about significant, disheartening changes in
many areas of civil rights law.
Since this shift in the federal judiciary was precipitated through the work-
ings of the political process, efforts to counter a total evisceration of the civil
rights gains written into law by the Warren Court of the sixties will have to be
conducted through the political process. The result must be greater scrutiny
of appointments to the federal bench and greater involvement of the legislative
and executive branches of local, state, and federal government in protecting
fundamental rights such as those encompassed by affirmative action.
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